As human and artificial cognition grow into increasingly 'hybridized', it is becoming more and more complicated to recognize singularities in automated, depersonalized knowing, or acting collectives. This is especially a challenge for law, which depends on the clear attribution of actions and responsibility to legal persons and on the fundamental distinction between persons and things, subjects and objects, humans, and nature. 'Cognitive assemblages' destabilize this conventional binary; they change our embodied self-understanding, relational intersubjective experiences, and questions where legal regimes end or start by blurring distinctions between attribution, liability, and accountability. While cognitive assemblages come in many forms, experiences, and theories, this open panel seeks to examine philosophical, legal, and social questions regarding the epistemological and normative status of 'cognition' and 'agency' in the age of AI-human relationships. Focusing on persons, sensors, and networks, the session invites scholars to submit abstracts that examine questions of (legal) personhood (in robots or automated systems), artificial sensing (for instance those governing humans and vehicles), or on collective networks (e.g. interpersonal, interspecies, or human-object oriented interactions).
